DOES ORGANIZATION MATTER?
Effects O n June 10, 1999, a petroleum products pipeline ruptured, spilling one quarter of a million gallons of gasoline into a stream running through a city park in Bellingham, Washington. The fuel ignited, killing three people and causing extensive environmental damage to salmon habitat. The American Public Works Association subsequently recognized the salience of the pipeline safety issue, citing this event along with another tragedy the following year involving a natural gas pipeline in Carlsbad, New Mexico, as evidence (American Public Works Association Government Affairs Committee, 2001).
On May 17, 2001 , the Bush administration released its energy policy report in response to an escalating energy crisis and continuing electrical power shortages, notably, in California. Among its recommendations, this report called for modernization of the nation's energy infrastructure, citing a deteriorating and strained-to-capacity system of pipelines and transmission lines (National Energy Policy Development Group, 2001 ).
The two issues of safety and supply have focused national attention on the country's energy transport system. Targeted in the energy report, pipelines and transmission lines comprise a special type of transportation corridor. Until recently, these crucial components of the energy delivery network have received relatively little notice. Now, industry is proposing new energy facilities at a rate unanticipated a decade ago.
Siting such facilities presents a challenge to both public and private interests. Historically, discussion of pipelines has centered on water and sewer systems, generally excluding the private sector from the issue, whereas current literature turns its attention to large public-private projects such as the Chunnel (Lentz, 2001) . Private participation in public works is a growing trend, and some private works are essentially public in nature, a case in point being natural gas and petroleum pipelines.
In the context of pipeline siting, this article poses the question, "Does the organizational form chosen by statute writers to obtain a particular outcome really matter?" Pipeline-siting decisions in Washington, Oregon, and Montana convey provocative results. The facts of the matter are straightforward. Legislators in the state of Washington introduced a new organizational form-one-stop shopping-designed to expand energy facilities, ensure adequate supply, and reduce complexity while protecting humans and the environment. Oregonians followed suit. However, officials in Montana retained the more traditional approach to facility-siting review. In the three states studied, the outcomes are counterintuitive. Washington, the state instituting the earliest and most carefully designed process, 1 has sited no pipelines since 1970 (Hornbaker & Rodgers, 2001) , whereas the other two have seen all such projects approved and completed. The Montana process, one that officials in the other two states sought to reform, has produced a greater number of pipeline sitings.
Conventional expectations of the administrative reform might be an increased number of successful sitings; more timely decisions; greater certainty in planning; public participation balancing interests; fewer incidents; and reduced litigation. However, this does not appear to be uniformly the case. Findings suggest that attempts to regulate a complex technology encounter substantial difficulties in determining future outcomes through organizational reform. Legislative intent may be thwarted in many ways, deliberately or by happenstance.
Against the historical backdrop of the pipeline-siting cases, this article explores a question important both in theory and practice: Does organization matter? Three complementary literatures inform the discussion: legislative attempts to control agency-generated outcomes, reform of administrative procedures as instruments of control, and energy facility siting forms. Illustrative snapshots, drawn from the universe of the study's siting cases, link theory with experience. Finally, the study suggests how factors other than organization may account for variations in outcome.
The Case Study
Surveying applications that have moved through the three different siting processes produces surprising results (see Table 1 ). In the time period studied, officials reviewed eight pipeline applications. Washington processed applications for three different petroleum pipelines (see Appendix A). None were successful. Oregon approved two natural gas pipelines, and an extension of one of those is pending (see Appendix B). Under its less inclusive Major Facilities Siting Act (MMFSA), Montana has approved two petroleum pipeline proposals. However, confining Montana's data to the MMFSA is misleading. Other "nonmajor" pipelines have been constructed, and selected cases of those are included in this study (see Appendix C).
2 Because siting information lacks centralization in one place, the totality of Montana siting outcomes cannot be canvassed.
This study includes 10 cases, including all pipeline applications made under the three siting statutes. Case study is the preferred method for examining contemporary events when relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated (Yin, 1994) and where only a "small n" exists. Pipeline siting cases have particular value because a pipeline's linear nature evokes and magnifies the range of siting problems. In addition, pipelines tend to be common elements in state siting statutes, which are not uniform with regard to the facilities included.
Case analysis assumes that the objects of investigation are similar yet separate enough to permit being treated as comparable instances of the same general phenomena. They have both uniqueness and commonality (Ragin, 1994; Stake, 1995) . The pipeline sitings included in this study exhibit both shared and individual characteristics. Moreover, this study's choice of nearly contiguous states allows observation of local eccentricities within the context of regional similarities. As well as being "typical," cases may represent a critical test of existing theory, a rare or unique event, or serve an explanatory purpose (Yin, 1994) , and cases are chosen to maximize what may be learned from them (Stake, 1995) . All these elements are found in the domain of pipeline applications. The choice of Montana pipeline-siting cases outside the MMFSA is not to be confused with sampling research but is indicative of what happens outside Montana's major facilities law. Case studies serve to accumulate knowledge in the field and are a valuable part of the methodological spectrum (Jensen & Rodgers, 2001 
The Historical Backdrop
Distinctly different processes have evolved in Washington, Oregon, and Montana during the 30-year endeavor of state policy makers to keep pace with growing energy demands. Due to dramatic predictions of growth and perception of energy shortfalls, instituting a means of siting energy facilities appeared on states' legislative agendas in the early 1970s (Achterman & Mostow, 1996) . Meanwhile, the modern-day environmental movement was in its infancy. Under such circumstances, a deliberate change in administrative form suggests the need to make a given process more effective or to shape specific outcomes.
Although the process varies between states, most states with energy facility siting laws have followed Washington's 1970 model, the first one-stop siting law in the nation and the prototype for many other states (Ching, 1981) . In 1972, only five states had adopted energy facility siting laws (Achterman & Mostow, 1996) ; by 1980, at least 18 other states had similar legislation (Granger & Wise, 1980) . In 1970, Washington enacted a siting statute (Energy Facilities-Site Locations, 2000) with the goal of providing sufficient energy for the state's continuing economic development while minimizing the adverse effects of such expansion on the natural environment. The legislature established the Thermal Power Plant Siting Council to centralize evaluation of thermal energy projects in a single location within state government. Previously, the review process for energy facility proposals involved many state agencies making separate decisions. The following year, Oregon established the Nuclear and Thermal Energy Council, which had jurisdiction over the siting of power plants (Regulation of Energy Facilities, 1999) . Montana did not follow the trend of legislation specific to energy facilities. In 1973, its legislature enacted a Major Facility Siting Act, which includes pipelines (Montana Major Facility Siting Act, 2001) .
Washington and Oregon siting statutes continued on a parallel course. In 1975, the Oregon council's name was changed to the Energy Facility Siting Council and its jurisdiction expanded to cover all types of energy facilities (Black, 1976) . Following a report by the State Energy Policy Council, Washington amended its original legislation-effective in 1976-to incorporate thermal power plant siting functions into a more comprehensive organization, the Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council, and to include additional major energy facilities. At this point, pipelines became a part of all three stories.
Controlling Outcomes
Scholars and practitioners have generally assumed that form matters. Positive political theorists argue that legislators regard the choice of administrative structure as vitally important. Also, specified administrative procedures serve as a means to guide agencies toward decisions consistent with the preferences of the legislative coalition that approved the agency's enabling act (McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987 . Kaufman (1976) suggests that legislators often act strategically in establishing new agencies with an exclusive concern to assure empha- sis on certain programs. Others hold that variations, such as structural characteristics, function to protect the agency from the influence of external environmental actors (Brudney & Hebert, 1987) . Another group of scholars argue that over time, political coalitions change and agencies drift away from their initial courses, developing separate interests through institutionalization and changing external relations (Shepsle, 1992; Waterman & Meier, 1998) . The judiciary represents yet another influence on bureaucratic outcomes (Horn & Shepsle, 1989; Kerwin, 1994; Robinson, 1989) . However, Macey (1992) suggests that an organization's structure and design can control the legislative and bureaucratic drift away from original intent. If viewed as a single principal in a principal-agent relationship, legislators have the problem of controlling the agency they created. For at least a decade, agency theory has dominated bureaucratic politics literature (Waterman & Meier, 1998; Worsham, Eisner, & Ringquist, 1997) . More recently, scholars have proposed that the principal-agent model has limited use in defining bureaucratic politics and legislative control of agencies because multiple rather than dyadic relationships often exist and a broader social-political-economic context frames the debate (Hammond & Knott, 1996; Spence, 1997; Waterman & Meier, 1998; Worsham et al., 1997) .
Rosenbloom (2000) suggests that if agencies are legislative extensions, prescribing legislativebranch involvement in administration goes well beyond the principal-agent model. He argues that at an earlier time, public administrators and legislators together embraced the values of efficiency, economy, and organizational effectiveness, but as manifested in the 1946 Federal Administrative Procedures Act, lawmakers have come to regard agencies as mere extensions of the legislative branch. They have created procedural control mechanisms to promote democratic values of participation, responsiveness, accountability, fairness, transparency, and freedom from governmental intrusion (Rosenbloom, 2000) .
Procedures serve as a means of controlling outcomes. But whether substantive administrative decisions are, in fact, influenced by the modification of administrative procedures remains a controversial question (Ching, 1981; Spence, 1999) . Procedural tinkerers in the legislative branch attempt to use process to achieve substantive political results they are unable or unwilling to secure by clear statutory language (Kerwin, 1994) . Certainly, procedural modifications within an existing agency have been found to make the agency more productive and responsive (Kerwin, 1990 (Kerwin, , 1994 Langbein & Kerwin, 2000) . However, Spence (1999) argues that an agency may also construe new requirements narrowly and use its discretion to minimize the policy effects of newly mandated procedures. And, as Wilson (1989) points out, the bureaucracy worries more about process than about final outcome.
The amount of attention scholars, legislators, and administrators devote to organizational reform and procedures makes a strong statement that these groups think administrative form does indeed matter. Calls for reform in the area of pipeline safety and product supply beg the question, "Does shaping or reforming the decision process affect siting outcomes to a significant degree?"
Washington State's Answer
The actions of Washington legislative and executive branch members in 1970 clearly indicate they believed administrative reform mattered (Hornbaker & Rodgers, 2001 ). This story lends credence to the premise that legislative coalitions do attempt to control outcomes through the laws they pass; it also supports Rosenbloom's (2000) proposition that the legislative branch regards agencies as its institutional extensions: the statute models democratic values and control procedures.
Responding to complaints about the lack of consistency and cohesion in the state's siting process, an energy facility siting bill was introduced by executive request in January 1970. In addition to the energy shortage, Governor Daniel J. Evans recognized the increasing importance of environmental issues. He decided to hold a special session of the legislature with the agenda limited to environmental matters. Early in the scenario, Evans met with the newly formed Wash-
The amount of attention scholars, legislators, and administrators devote to organizational reform and procedures makes a strong statement that these groups think administrative form does indeed matter.
ington Environmental Council and subsequently convened three groups of participants: legislative leaders, leaders of the environmental movement, and the heads of all departments involved in environmental issues. These players met in the autumn of 1969 to determine which environmental concerns they deemed most important. After narrowing a list of approximately 50 items to six, energy facility siting emerged high on the agenda. Evans asked and environmental leaders agreed to confine themselves to six core issues in return for calling the special session. The siting statute passed into law as the result of accommodation reached by the enacting coalition: industry, environmental groups, and agencies.
Environmentalists demanded that public interest in the environment be protected fully and that precautions be strictly prescribed. Meanwhile, energy interests would not back legislation that did not offer a "one-stop" service. Their objective was absolute approval authority located in a single regulatory agency. Both sides' requirements were included in the final legislation. The composition of the original council incorporated a range of coalition interests: a chairman appointed by the governor and representatives of 15 state agencies, augmented by a representative from each local jurisdiction involved.
The statute contained innovative ex-ante control features crucial to the environmental community's interests. Applicant fees pay an independent consultant who verifies and elaborates on information in the application, institutionalizing and objectifying necessary scientific evaluation. Next, the Counsel for the Environment, an assistant attorney general appointed by the state attorney general, represents the public and its interest in protecting the environment. Thus, the act provides for two professionals financed by public monies to protect the public interest. Furthermore, a disclosure section empowers the public by mandating freedom of information. The act requires public hearings in affected jurisdictions and contested case hearings or adjudications, invoking the full range of procedural rights, including discovery and cross-examination.
Central to the energy industry's interests, council decisions hold preemptive power. In the event of a conflict, other law is deemed superseded. Recognizing the need for timeliness, the governor-the state's chief political officer-must make a final decision to approve or reject an application within 60 days of receiving a council recommendation.
In this story, one finds virtually a textbook case supporting the literature: an enacting coalition, careful attention to administrative structure and procedures, ex-ante controls, due process protections, and the incorporation of democratic processes such as public participation, accountability, fairness, and transparency.
Energy Facility Siting Forms
Legislators who enact siting laws choose siting forms they expect will accomplish their objectives. Pipeline sitings tend to be controversial: they possess the potential for major environmental impacts; they commonly cross a number of jurisdictional boundaries; they affect a variety of interest groups; and they often involve high economic stakes. Constructing an effective design to counter these difficulties combined with decisions of staggering factual and political complexity presents an enormous challenge (May, 1978) . The states of Washington, Oregon, and Montana represent an interesting contrast in siting form design.
Four principal categories encompass the range of energy facility siting forms: (a) fast track, (b) coordinative one stop, (c) preemptive one stop, and (d) ad hoc. Fast-track and one-stop siting have evolved to overcome the difficulties of red tape and delay in the siting process (Ching, 1981) . With fast track, selected energy projects are placed on an expedited schedule through the usual siting procedures. Fast-track siting can theoretically overlay other types of siting. The preemptive one-stop siting used in Washington and Oregon and the ad hoc approach seen in Montana represent the two most common forms in the country.
In the one-stop approach, a single agency, board, or council accepts a multipurpose application from the developer of the proposed energy facility (Ching, 1981) . This single administrative body evaluates aspects of the project and has the authority to approve or deny, increasing sit- This administrative body either has coordinating capacity or preemptive regulatory powers (Prasse, 1984 ). Washington's Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council is a consummate example of the latter, whereas Oregon's Energy Facility Siting Council sweeps all applicable state and local siting criteria into its decision process and can preempt state administrative rules and local ordinances in the public interest.
Ad hoc siting, found in Montana, describes a process whereby states have not enacted special energy facility laws. Thus, these facilities are subject to the full range of regulations applied to any other major industrial siting proposal-a myriad of federal, state, and local permits and requirements. As such, any number of authorities potentially holds veto authority (Prasse, 1984) .
Legislative Intent
The specific details in a statute reflect legislative choices and objectives. The dimensions of pipelines coming under statutory siting jurisdiction provide a window into the respective legislative intents of the three states. Pipeline criteria in Washington and Oregon are dramatically more inclusive than they are in Montana (see Table 2 ). Montana's statute leaves a considerable number of pipelines to other siting methods, a void partially filled by federal agencies such as the Department of the Interior and the Forest Service.
Montanans clearly intend to site pipelines. One Montana exclusion applies to pipelines of the same specifications mandated in the MMFSA. If the constructing entity has obtained right-ofway agreements or options from more than 75% of owners who collectively own more than 75% of the property involved, the siting can be effected without state agency involvement. Montana is the only western jurisdiction granting the power of eminent domain to all corporations (Kaze, 1974) , and exercising eminent domain is reiterated in another statute concerning pipeline carriers (Pipeline Carriers, 2001) .
Because Montana contains extensive public lands, a proposed pipeline route will likely cross federal property, triggering an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act. A Yellowstone Pipe Line Company venture illustrates what may occur outside the MMFSA in the way of federal involvement. In 1996, Yellowstone proposed a new section of and changes to its existing pipeline. The company needed to replace an 87-mile portion of pipeline after the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes terminated Yellowstone's rightof-way through the Flathead Indian Reservation in 1995. Approximately 25 miles of the proposed route crossed the Lolo National Forest; the remainder involved local jurisdictions and private ownership. The Forest Service, nine other jurisdictions, and the tribes entered into a memorandum of understanding for a cooperative environmental impact statement prepared by the Aspen Environmental Group. After 4 years, Yellowstone withdrew its proposal, stating they found the Forest Service's recommended alternative, the I-90 route, economically infeasible and that its clients had lost confidence in the fairness and objectivity of the process.
The Montana Department of Environmental Quality indicates that a number of privately sited pipelines exist, owned and operated by Cenex, Conoco, Amoco, and Exxon. Some, 75 to 100 miles in length, have avoided state or federal review, exhibiting interesting twists and turns in routing.
Drifting away from original legislative intent is potentially a problem. Judicial review and adjudication provisions found in all three state statutes prevent straying far from these values. The quasi-legal proceeding involves many attorneys representing varying interests and holds the council accountable on its record, leaving little room for arbitrary and capricious action. For example, the Washington Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council's December 1998 service list for Application 96-1 shows two counsels for the environment; three for the applicant; eight for state agencies; 16 for cities, counties, and water districts collectively; two for tribes; two for fed-
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Pipeline criteria in Washington and Oregon are dramatically more inclusive than they are in Montana. eral agencies; and six for other third parties. Some attorneys represented more than one party, and many parties had more than one attorney-all committed to seeing that procedures serve client interests.
Procedural Influences
Procedures appropriate to implementing statutory goals are found in all three statutes.
3 A decision-making body, time requirements, consolidation of permits, environmental review, protection of procedural rights, rule-making powers, adjudication, public participation, and judicial review are found in each state process (see Table 3 ).
Oregon's two-part process of standards and adjudication is front loaded. The initial use of specific standards for determining compliance with the Energy Facility Siting Council, state and local standards, and early public comment periods distinguishes the Oregon process. A problematic issue is unlikely to reach adjudication in its original form. For example, Northwest Natural's 1999 application for a natural gas pipeline proposed a route that traversed Class 1 salmon-stream habitat, an issue raised by local property owners who opposed the extension. Northwest Natural chose to amend its proposal, removing the controversial segment instead of challenging the Endangered Species Act. In a pending proposal, the company hopes to have satisfactorily redesigned the portion of the route removed from its previous application. Thus, by the time Oregon's formal adjudication takes place, many issues have already been resolved. In contrast to that of Washington, the Oregon procedure involving early use of specific standards speeds up the siting process and may account in part for the greater number of sitings.
Other Influences on Outcome
Along with administrative form and procedures, this study finds that additional factors influence siting outcomes in varying degrees and may account for so-called anomalies in expected outcomes. Assuming the validity of the legislative-control theory, avoiding such aberrations tests the perspicacity of the enacting coalition.
People think of the United States beyond the Mississippi River as the West. Within this vast area lies the Pacific Northwest, exhibiting common features other than geography (Andrus & Connelly, 1998; Elazar, 1966; Robbins, 2001; Sharkansky, 1978; White, 1991) . Elazar (1966) argues that political patterns are distributed geographically and modified by local conditions. Where the Columbia River watershed unifies and defines the region, Northwesterners as a group are iconoclastic and environmental (Robbins, 2001) . But although commonalties exist, each state has its own distinct culture, laws, and ways of doing business. As one would expect, these factors' effects are seen in siting outcomes.
During enactment of a statute, the politics and culture of a state are inherent influences. Cultural attitudes and behaviors can affect outcomes at least twice during a decision process: initially, in the design, and later, as public participation unfolds. Once an individual adopts a partic- ular set of ideas and institutions, a wide range of other attitudes and behaviors follow (Ellis & Thompson, 1997) . 4 Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) find that political preferences of state citizens dominate all other variables when viewed as a cause for the ideological tilt of a state's policies and that high correlation between environmental measures and a policy usually indicate that the policy satisfies public demand. Because citizens influence elected officials-another principal-agent relationship-and all three states in the study allow citizen participation, culture and politics exert a "double whammy" on siting outcomes.
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The constitutional stories of Montana and Washington illustrate just such cultural and political differences, which are reflected in the respective siting policies. Both territories attained statehood in 1889. In 1972, Montana adopted a new constitution. The 1889 document codified Hornbaker / REFORM EFFECTS ON PIPELINE SITING 179 what was viewed at the time as the primary object of political action, facilitating economic development (Roeder, 1990) . The state's new constitution broadened the powers of its judiciary, which is activist and legislative and has dominated the branches of government (Stephens, 1990) . It also enunciated a strong although nonspecific environmental focus and reflected concerns about private rights (Dowling, 1990; Schmidt & Thompson, 1990) . Convention debate testifies to the colliding values of individual freedom versus environment protection (Schmidt & Thompson, 1990) : the new constitution was approved by the narrow margin of 50.2%. The Montana experience tends to confirm the Erikson et al. (1993) observation that citizens exert significant influence on state policies. Washington's 1889 constitution reflects even more distrust of the abuse of sovereign power than does the U. S. Constitution. In its governmental culture, Washington citizens and interest groups have a degree of access not found in most states or at the federal level (Bish, 1982) . Decisions are made through a popularistic and pluralistic structure. Studies matching citizen preferences with those of elected officials reveal high levels of agreement between citizens and officials. Bish (1982) further observes that Washington's system is exemplary in its openness, flexibility, and responsiveness.
Significant differences surface in state attitudes toward the petroleum industry as a purveyor of pipelines. A Freudenburg and Grambling (1994) study concludes that whether public preferences in a state support or oppose oil development is a reflection of the sociohistorical realities of people and place. The fact that Washington state archives contain a 1970 report titled "How Can the People of the State of Washington Coexist With the Oil Industry?" indicates a longstanding distrust of the petroleum industry and suggests that siting a crude or refined products pipeline would become an uphill battle in this particular state.
The Exogenous Event
Organization, law, politics, and culture do not entirely account for results in the siting process. Unpredictable outside events can also be powerful determinants of outcome. The aforementioned Bellingham incident is one such example. Had Olympic Pipe Line Company been able to resolve the question of crossing state park lands, the Cross Cascades Pipeline might have been the first pipeline sited in Washington since 1970.
In 1996, Olympic applied for a 231-mile extension eastward from its existing north-south pipeline. This 400-mile underground pipeline west of the Cascade Mountains has operated since 1965. Until the June 10, 1999, Bellingham rupture, few people had even heard of the pipeline. A chain of events suggestive of a Perrow (1999) normal accident (in which certain characteristics of high-risk technologies make accidents inevitable or "normal") resulted in death and damage on the very day experts were testifying about pipeline safety in the adjudicative hearing. Withdrawal of Application 96-1 was an immediate and direct result of the tragedy (Hornbaker & Rodgers, 2001 ).
Conclusion
In light of renewed national attention, the linear subset of energy facilities commands the attention of the public works community. The substantive result of siting applications affects supply, and a well-designed siting process protects human welfare and the natural environment. Identifying influential factors in siting-procedure outcomes can improve the nation's ability to meet ever-increasing energy needs and mitigate adverse impacts.
Washington designed a powerful agency with the intent of siting with greater speed, efficiency, and safety. In the case of petroleum pipelines, it has not achieved that result. The prospect of efficient, timely siting is at odds with the deliberate pace of the environmental protection reviews that reflect state culture and politics. In contrast, Oregon's front-loaded, standard-based process and Montana attitudes resulting in less process have achieved more sitings.
PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / January 2003
The constitutional stories of Montana and Washington illustrate just such cultural and political differences, which are reflected in the respective siting policies.
If organizational form has no discernable effect on decisions, then other influences such as culture, law, politics, and exogenous events must account for differences in outcome. But if those play only a minor role, one would expect to see form as the major determinant underlying the outcome of a siting case.
Siting data from Washington, Oregon, and Montana support the McCubbins et al. (1987 McCubbins et al. ( , 1989 thesis that legislators attempt to control future outcomes through organizational design as well as Rosenbloom's (2000) proposition that the legislative branch regards agencies as its institutional extensions, hence reflecting democratic processes. In addition, the data reinforce the empirical finding of Erikson et al. (1993) that political preferences of state citizens dominate all other variables as a cause for the ideological tilt of a state's policies.
This study does not find agency theory (which has dominated bureaucratic politics literature for years) serviceable. It agrees with more recent scholars, who have found that the principalagent model affords only limited use in defining bureaucratic politics and legislative control of agencies.
Additional studies exploring a decision process from intent to outcome would be useful in obtaining a clearer picture of what actually happens. In legislative design, anticipating eventualities may lead to successful ex-ante control. But in negotiating the path through a controversial and complex pipeline-siting process, a prudent approach would be to expect the unexpected.
In the energy policy arena, organization does make a difference. But it does not operate in a vacuum. Politics, culture, and exogenous events at times may hold the trump cards in the process game. 
